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A number of recent studies have documented extensive downward nominal wage rigidity 
(DNWR) for job stayers in many OECD countries. However, DNWR for individual workers may 
induce downward rigidity or “a floor” for the aggregate wage growth at positive or negative 
levels. Aggregate wage growth may be below zero because of compositional effects, for 
example that old, high-wage workers are replaced by young low-wage workers. DNWR may 
also lead to a positive growth in aggregate wages because of changes in relative wages. We 
explore industry data for 19 OECD countries, over the period 1971–2006. We find evidence for 
floors on nominal wage growth at 6 percent and lower in the 1970s and 1980s, at one percent 
in the 1990s, and at 0.5 percent in the 2000s. Furthermore, we find that DNWR is stronger in 
country-years with strict employment protection legislation, high union density, centralised 
wage setting and high inflation. 
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in this paper are those of the authors alone and cannot be attributed to Norges Bank. A number of recent studies have documented extensive downward nominal wage rigidity
(dnwr) for job stayers in many oecd countries, see e.g Dickens et al. (2007), Dessy
(2002), Knoppik and Beissinger (2005) and Lebow et al. (2003). Consistent with this,
Akerlof et al. (1996) and Bewley (1999) report strong evidence of dnwr based on inter-
views and surveys of employees and employers. Prevalent dnwr is also likely to induce
downward rigidity in aggregate wages, as found by Holden and Wulfsberg (2008a). How-
ever, from the outset, it is not clear that any rigidity will be most important at zero
growth, i.e. constant nominal wages, as one would expect at the micro level. There are
several mechanisms that might transform dnwr at zero nominal wage growth for in-
dividual workers to a “ﬂoor” for the industry level wage growth that is diﬀerent from
zero. The most important is probably compositional changes in the labour market, for
example if old high-wage workers are replaced by younger workers with lower wages, or
if jobs are shifted over from high-wage ﬁrms with rigid wages to other ﬁrms with lower
wages. Combined with individual dnwr at zero percent, this might lead to a deﬁcit of
industry level wage changes below negative growth rates for example –2 percent, i.e. a
“ﬂoor” at –2 percent.
On the other hand, there are also mechanisms by which dnwr at zero for individual
workers leads to a positive wage growth at more aggregate levels. One mechanism,
emphasised by macro and labour economists in the 1960s and 1970s (see Tobin, 1972), is
that changes in relative wages, for example due to sector speciﬁc shocks, induce aggregate
wage growth if dnwr prevents wage reductions in labour markets with excess supply.
Downward rigidity might also involve a ratchet eﬀect, where workers with rigid wages
and secure jobs use threats of reduced work eﬀort to enforce a rise in nominal wages
(see Moene, 1988, Cramton and Tracy, 1992, and Holden, 1997). In this case the dnwr
at zero percent for individuals would manifest in a deﬁcit of wage changes below some
positive rate, say below 2–3 percent growth. The overall eﬀect of dnwr on aggregate
wage growth is thus ultimately an empirical question, which we aim to explore in this
paper.
The issue of whether dnwr might lead to a ﬂoor for the aggregate wage growth is
of great importance for monetary policy. Tobin (1972), Akerlof et al. (1996, 2000) and
Holden (1994) argue that if inﬂation is so low that dnwr binds, the result will be excess
wage pressure and higher unemployment. Thus, one would want the inﬂation target to be
suﬃciently high so that the risk of widespread binding dnwr is small. If there is a ﬂoor
for wage growth above zero, a target of, say, two percent inﬂation may involve the risk of
pervasive binding dnwr, unless productivity growth is so high that it provides suﬃcient
scope for wages to grow faster than prices. On the other hand, if a ﬂoor is below zero, an
inﬂation target of two percent may involve only a small risk of binding dnwr. Downward
rigidity of nominal wages may also be of considerable policy relevance within the emu,
where the target of union-wide inﬂation below two percent implies that inﬂation will be
considerably lower in countries with a weaker cyclical situation and lower inﬂation than
the union average. In such situations a ﬂoor for the wage growth may induce excessive
2wage pressure even if the ﬂoor is below zero.
The possible existence of downward nominal rigidity of industry wages is also rele-
vant for business cycle research. Carlsson and Westermark (2008) show that dnwr has
important implications for the cyclical response of the economy, and thus also for the
optimal monetary policy. Again, the rate at which a ﬂoor binds determines for which
inﬂation rate the ﬂoor is of practical relevance.
Gordon (1996) and Mankiw (1996) argue that the extent of dnwr depend on the
macroeconomic environment. Referring to the experience from the Great Depression in
the 1930s, they claim that “nominal wage reductions would no longer be seen as unusual
if the average nominal wage was not growing” (Gordon, 1996, p.62). It is therefore
interesting to investigate the existence of wage ﬂoors at non-zero levels and its possible
correlation with the inﬂation rate using data for the recent period of low and stable
inﬂation.
In order to investigate the existence of wage ﬂoors in the aggregate economy, we
explore industry data for 19 oecd countries, over the period 1973–2006. More than
13,000 observations from 604 country-year samples, i.e. an average of 23 industries per
sample. To explore whether there is a ﬂoor on wage growth, we extend the method
we have used in our previous work on dnwr (Holden and Wulfsberg, 2008a). Roughly,
the test goes as follows. We construct the assumed distribution of wage changes under
ﬂexibility (i.e. without dnwr, referred to as the “notional” wage change distribution),
on the basis of observations from country-years when the wage growth is high, and thus
dnwr is not likely to bind. By comparing empirical and notional country-year speciﬁc
wage change distributions for diﬀerent ﬂoors, we can construct country-year speciﬁc
estimates of the extent of dnwr, given by the deﬁcit of wage changes below the ﬂoors in
the empirical samples. Given our estimates of dnwr for some 600 country-year samples,
we proceed by exploring how dnwr is related to economic and institutional variables like
unemployment, inﬂation, employment protection, union density, etc. Our large data set
with a broad span across countries and over time gives us a good opportunity to detect
the possible eﬀect of these variables on the extent of dnwr.
Compared to the existing literature on dnwr, this paper makes two main contribu-
tions. First, we explore the extent of dnwr at non-zero growth rates – an issue that has
received scant attention in previous work.1 Second, we extend the empirical analysis in
Holden and Wulfsberg (2008a) to include the years from 2000 to 2006.
To preview our results, we ﬁnd evidence of ﬂoors on aggregate wage growth as high
as 5–6 percent in 1970s. According to our point estimates, around 40 percent of the
notional industry wage changes in the 1970s below 5 percent were pushed up above 5
percent. In the 1980s, the ﬂoors were at somewhat lower levels, yet 20 percent of all
wage changes below 4 percent were pushed up above 4 percent. In the 1990s, the ﬂoors
1Holden (1998), analysing wage setting at central level for the manufacturing sectors in the Nordic
countries, ﬁnd evidence of a ﬂoor on nominal wage growth given at 2–3 percent in the decades from
1960s to 1980s.
3fell down to about zero, with a fraction of notional wage cuts prevented by dnwr of
about 20 percent. In the 2000s, we ﬁnd evidence of a ﬂoor in the Nordic countries at 0–1
percent wage growth, and also some evidence for Southern European countries as well as
for the oecd as a whole.
The paper is organised as follows. In section 1, we discuss the link between dnwr and
aggregate wage growth. Section 2 presents the data and empirical approach, while section
3 contains the main results as to the extent of dnwr. In section 4, we explore whether
the variation in dnwr across countries and time can be explained by institutional and
economic variables. Section 5 concludes. The appendices contain supplementary material
on data and results.
1 dnwr and ﬂoors for aggregate wage growth
The observational unit in our study is the change in the average hourly earnings in an
industry (see description of the data in section 2 below). The change in the average
earnings is aﬀected both by the average change for job stayers, and by compositional
eﬀects due to diﬀerences in wages between new hires and the workers that leave the
industry. If dnwr binds for some job stayers in the industry and pushes their wage
change above zero, this will also reduce the likelihood that the industry wage change is
below zero. As noted in the introduction, however, there are also a number of mechanisms
that could transform dnwr at zero for individual workers to a ﬂoor for nominal wage
growth at more aggregate levels that is diﬀerent from zero.
Several eﬀects may give rise to some downward ﬂexibility. At the individual level,
even if base wages are rigid, it might be possible to reduce bonus schemes, fringe beneﬁts,
etc. Wage rigidity for some groups of workers or in some ﬁrms, might also cause jobs
to move to other groups of workers or other ﬁrms, where wages are ﬂexible and lower.
Furthermore, turnover might give rise to considerable downward ﬂexibility. Over time,
old, high-wage workers retire, and they are replaced by younger workers usually with
lower pay. In situations where redundancies are required, ﬁrms may have some discretion
in choosing whom to lay oﬀ, and they may then choose to lay oﬀ workers with high wages.
Note, however, that even if these mechanisms may all involve a reduction in aggregate
wages, yet the existence of individual dnwr may nevertheless imply that there is a ﬂoor
below zero on the aggregate nominal wage growth.
On the other hand, dnwr at the individual level may also lead to nominal wage
growth in the aggregate. One reason (see Tobin (1972) and Akerlof et al. (1996, 2000)),
is that the need for changes in relative wages requires growth in average wages if there is
downward rigidity of nominal wages. A second mechanism, analysed by Moene (1988),
Cramton and Tracy (1992) and Holden (1997), is based on the assumption that employ-
ment contracts are incomplete. As argued by Moene (1988), employees under a ﬁxed wage
contracts may impose a cost on the ﬁrm without violating the employment contract, for
example by meticulously adhering to the exact words in the employment contract. Such
4behaviour is well known as “work-to-rule” in wage negotiations in many industrialised
economies. Holden (1997) shows that the outcome of the wage setting will be a nominal
wage increase if workers can impose a larger cost on the ﬁrm than vice versa during a
work-to-rule.
Growth in nominal wages might also be a consequence of ﬁrms’ attempt to induce
higher eﬀort from the employees. In many countries, a large part of the employees are
hired under ﬁxed nominal wage contracts, with fairly stringent employment protection.
In such situations, it might be diﬃcult for the ﬁrm to ensure that employees provide
suﬃcient eﬀort. One way of ensuring high eﬀort might be to give nominal wage increases
to workers who supply high eﬀort.2
Overall, if there exist positive or negative ﬂoors on nominal wage growth in aggregate
data, they are likely to vary between countries, industries, and over time, depending on
the legal and institutional setting, remuneration systems, the views of employees and
employers, inﬂation expectations, etc. Further, the possible existence and levels of such
ﬂoors is clearly an empirical issue.
As noted above, we are looking for a deﬁcit of wage changes below various ﬂoors, that
is caused by dnwr. However, a deﬁcit of wage changes below certain ﬂoors might also be
caused by other mechanisms. For example, if there are systematic cyclical compositional
changes in the workforce, so that the share of low-skilled workers decreases in recessions,
this will dampen the downward pressure on wages in the recession (Solon et al., 1994).
However, these mechanisms would be in real terms, and lead to a deﬁcit of real wage
changes below certain levels, and not to a ﬂoor for nominal wage growth as we are
looking for. Possibly, ﬂoors on wage growth may also be caused by bargaining systems
or minimum wages. If such ﬂoors are in nominal terms, they would still imply that the
rate of inﬂation aﬀects relative wages via the eﬀect on the wage change distribution, as
do other forms of dnwr. In section 4, we explore to the link between labour market
institutions and macro variables on dnwr.
Some of the mechanisms discussed above, for example the work-to-rule mechanism,
seem better tested on micro data than more aggregate data. Incidentally, Nickell and
Quintini (2003), who focus on dnwr at zero, report that there are employees “who
would have had a negative nominal wage changes without the distortion who, in fact,
have signiﬁcantly positive, rather than zero, nominal wage changes”. This is exactly
what is predicted by the work-to-rule story mentioned above. However, micro studies
would have more diﬃculty in capturing whether positive wage growth induced by dnwr
for some workers leads to lower wage growth for other workers, possibly oﬀsetting the
aggregate eﬀects. In contrast, such eﬀects might show up in studies on more aggregate
data, as in our study.
2Clearly, there exists other mechanisms to provide incentives for eﬀort, like bonus schemes and piece
rates. However, it is an empirical fact that on many work-places, employers do choose a ﬁxed wage
system. Furthermore, in an inﬂationary setting, nominal wage increases to workers who provide high
eﬀort might be a simple and useful incentive scheme.
52 Data and empirical approach
We use an unbalanced panel of industry level data for the annual percentage growth of
gross hourly earnings for manual workers from the manufacturing, mining and quarrying,
electricity, gas and water supply, and construction sectors of 19 oecd countries in the
period 1973–2006. The countries included in the sample are Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Nether-
lands, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Sweden, the uk and the us. The main data source
are wages in manufacturing from the ilo and harmonised hourly earnings in manufactur-
ing from Eurostat. One observation is thus denoted wjit where j is index for industry,
i is index for country and t is index for year. There are all together 13,694 observations
distributed across 604 country-year samples, on average 23 industries per country-year.
More details on the data are provided in Appendix A.
The location and dispersion of the wage change distributions vary considerably be-
tween countries and over time, see Figure 1. The location of the wage change distributions
is likely to depend on variables like inﬂation, productivity growth and unemployment,
while the dispersion is aﬀected by among other things the size and dispersion of industry
speciﬁc shocks in that country-year. Wage cuts happened more frequently in the latter
half of the sample than in the ﬁrst half, see Figure 2.
To explore the existence of ﬂoors on nominal wage growth, we extend the method
that we have used previously, see Holden and Wulfsberg (2008a). The basic approach
is to construct a distribution of “notional” wage changes (i.e. the wage changes that
would take place in the absence of dnwr) and then detect dnwr in the empirical wage
changes by comparing the empirical and notional distributions of wage changes. If there
is a ﬂoor to nominal wage growth, it would compress the distribution of wage changes
from below, implying that there would be a lack of observations below this ﬂoor, relative
to a notional distribution. To illustrate the basic idea, consider the distribution of wage
changes within a given country-year sample, as in Figure 3 which displays a histogram
of the nominal wage changes in 16 industries in Norway in 1998. The asymmetric shape
of the histogram might suggest that in the absence of downward rigidity, there would
have been some observations of wage changes below ﬁve percent, consistent with the idea
that dnwr has pushed wage changes above this ﬂoor. However, to assess this conclusion
formally, we must make more speciﬁc assumptions about how the country-year wage
change distribution would have looked if there had been no downward rigidity, i.e. the
notional distribution of wage changes.
In line with previous work on this method (see e.g. Card and Hyslop, 1997; Knoppik
and Beissinger, 2003; or Nickell and Quintini, 2003), the Holden and Wulfsberg (2008a)
method constructs the country-year notional distributions on the basis of the empirical
wage distribution in high inﬂation years, when dnwr is less likely to be binding and
thus aﬀect the observations. Speciﬁcally, we assume that absent any dnwr, the notional
nominal wage growth in industry j in country i in year t, wN
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Figure 1: Box plots of the variation in country-year median wage growth (left) and the inter
percentile range (right). The boxes extends from the 25th to the 75th percentile, with the median
inside the box. The whiskers emerging from the box indicate the tails of the distributions, and
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Figure 2: The absolute number of wage cuts over time (left), and box plots of wage growth over
time (right).
unknown distribution G, which is parameterized by the median nominal wage growth,
N
it, and the dispersion, N
it ; G(N
it;N
it ). Thus, we allow the location and dispersion
of the notional wage growth to vary across countries and years, to capture the large
variation that exists across countries and across time with respect to monetary policy,
wage setting, and industry structure, while imposing the same structural form (or shape)
of G in all country-years. This structural form is constructed on the basis of a subset
of 1,605 observations from 66 high wage growth country-year samples, selected on the
basis that both the median nominal and the median real wage growth in the country
year are in their respective upper quartiles over all country-years.3 Imposing the same
structural form across countries and years is a strong assumption. However, it is also
very useful, as it makes it possible to construct the notional distribution from only high
wage growth years, which should not be aﬀected by possible dnwr. Furthermore, the
results from several alternative speciﬁcations of G reported below document that our
3Using the 66 country-year samples with median wage growth in the upper quartiles is clearly arbi-
trary. However, as shown in our previous work (Holden and Wulfsberg, 2008a), the results are robust to
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Figure 3: Histogram of wage growth in Norway, 1998.
ﬁndings are robust.
The formal procedure is as follows. First, we construct an underlying distribution
of wage changes, G, where the 1,605 empirical observations from the high wage growth
samples are normalised with respect to the observed country-year speciﬁc median, it,






; s = 1;:::;1605 (1)
where subscript s runs over all j;i and t in the 66 country-year samples. We use the inter
percentile range between the 75th and the 35th percentiles as our measure of dispersion,
following Nickell and Quintini (2003), to avoid that dnwr has an eﬀect on the measure
of dispersion. The calculated xs should thus be thought of as observations from the
standardised underlying two-parametric distribution X  G(0;1).
Second, for each of the 604 country-years in the full sample, we compute the country-
year speciﬁc distribution of notional wage changes by adjusting the underlying wage
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Thus, we have constructed 604 notional country-year distributions Zit  G(it;P75it  






In eﬀect, we have constructed a two-parametric distribution G, where the two parameters
of the distribution, (N
it;N
it ), take the value of their empirical median and inter-percentile
range, (it;P75it   P35it), while the shape or structural form is the same across all
country-years, based on the wage changes in the 66 country-year samples with high
wage growth. The left panel of Figure 4 displays the underlying distribution of wage
changes, with zero median and inter-percentile range of unity. Compared with the normal
distribution (not speciﬁed in the diagram), our underlying distribution has greater peak
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Figure 4: Left: Histogram and kernel density of the normalised underlying distribution of wage
changes. Right: Histogram of observed wage changes and the notional wage change distribution
in Norway 1998.
The right panel of Figure 4 compares the empirical distribution (histogram) for Nor-
way in 1998 with the corresponding notional country-year distribution. By construction
the two distributions have identical median and inter percentile range, but the shapes
diﬀer, as the notional distribution is based on the shape of the underlying distribution.
We observe that the country-speciﬁc notional distribution indicates a considerable prob-
ability of wage changes below 5 percent, in contrast to the empirical outcome.
As we are looking for the existence of possible positive or negative ﬂoors for the wage
growth, we look for a deﬁcit of wage changes below ﬂoors in the range from  5 to 7
percent. For each ﬂoor  2 f 5; 4:5; 4;:::;7g percent, we estimate the extent of
dnwr by comparing the incidence rate of notional wage changes below the ﬂoor with the
corresponding empirical incidence rate. For each ﬂoor, , the incidence rate of notional











where Sit is the number of observed industries in country-year it. An often-used measure
of dnwr is the fraction of wage changes below a certain ﬂoor that is prevented, fwcp(),
calculated as fwcp()it = 1 q()it=~ q()it. If, for example, the incidence of wage changes
below ﬂoor  in the empirical sample is half of that in the notional distribution, then the
fwcp() = 0:5.
As there are only on average 23 industries in each country-year sample, there may
be stochastic disturbances to the country-year speciﬁc variables it;P75it   P35it, and
qit, which may induce considerable noise in ~ qit and fwcpit. Thus, estimates of fwcp
in single country-years will be imprecise. However, averages of fwcpit for groups of
country-years will be much more precise. Thus, we will present estimates of the fwcp
9for regions and periods.
Under the null hypothesis of no dnwr, the notional country-year speciﬁc incidence
rate ~ q()it is a measure of the probability that a wage change observation in that country-
year is below the ﬂoor . Thus, using the notional country-year speciﬁc incidence rates we
can compute the probability distribution for the number of wage cuts in each country-year
under the null hypothesis of no dnwr directly by employing the formulae for binomial
distributions. However, for the full sample with some 600 country-years, this is com-
putationally infeasible. Therefore, we use the simulation method proposed in Holden
and Wulfsberg (2008a). Speciﬁcally, for each country-year it, we draw Sit times from
a binomial distribution with the country-speciﬁc notional probability ~ q()it. We then
count the number of simulated notional wage changes below , ^ Y (), and compare these
with the total number of observed wage changes below  in the corresponding empirical
distribution, Y (). For example, to test for a ﬂoor of 1 percent in Portugal, we compare
the simulated number of notional wage changes below 1 percent for all years in Portugal,
with the corresponding empirical number. We then repeat this procedure 5000 times,
and count the number of times where we simulate more notional wage changes below 
than we observe for each ﬂoor, denoted #(^ Y () > Y ()). The null hypothesis is rejected
with a level of signiﬁcance at 5 percent if we in less than 5 percent of the simulations
simulate more wage changes below the ﬂoor than the corresponding empirical number,
i.e. if 1   #(^ Y () > Y ())=5000  0:05.
As we condition on the empirical median and inter-percentile range, we can only
measure the eﬀect of dnwr in the left part of the wage change distribution, below
the 35th percentile. In a country-year where the eﬀect of dnwr is more extensive, so
that the 35th percentile is pushed up by dnwr, also the notional distribution, which is
constructed using the 35th percentile, will be compressed from below. This will reduce
the estimated notional probability of observing a wage change below the ﬂoor, inducing
a downward bias in the estimated dnwr. To mitigate this downward bias we exclude
country-year samples where the distribution of wage changes is so far to the left that
the 35th percentile would have been aﬀected by the ﬂoor that we look for. Speciﬁcally,
when we look for the existence of a ﬂoor at, say, 4 percent wage growth, we include only
country-year samples in which the 35th percentile is above 4 percent. This procedure
implies that our estimates of the fwcp are conditional on the wage distribution being
suﬃciently far to the right relative to the ﬂoor. For example, if we ﬁnd a fwcp of 0.5
below a ﬂoor of 4 percent wage growth, it says that in country-year samples where the
wage growth is suﬃciently high that the 35th percentile is above 4 percent, dnwr is
likely to prevent half of the wage changes below 4 percent, thus pushing up wage growth
further.
This conditionality removes some of the downward bias in our estimates, but not
all, as it may still be the case that dnwr at higher growth rates pushes up the 35
percentile. For example, if there is a ﬂoor at four percent wage growth, this would aﬀect
the notional wage change distribution in country-years where the 35 percentile is at or
10below 4 percent. As these country-year samples are included when we look for ﬂoors
below 4 percent, say zero percent, there will be a downward bias in our estimate of the
extent dnwr at zero. However, removing even more country-years would also reduce the
number of observations, which would reduce the precision of the estimates. We prefer to
have a known bias, working against ﬁnding dnwr, rather than reducing the number of
observations leading to more imprecise estimates.
The downward bias in our method is likely to be more severe in country-years with
low inﬂation, as dnwr may aﬀect individuals in all industries when inﬂation is low, also
in industries with high average wage increase. In that case dnwr may push the whole
wage change distribution to the right, which we don’t detect with our method. We shall
return to this issue in the interpretation of our results.
3 Estimates of dnwr
In Figure 5 we present estimates of the fwcp at ﬂoor levels of every half percentage point
between –5 and 7 percent for each decade in the sample. A signiﬁcant estimate at the 5
percent level is marked by a “” in the ﬁgure. Some of these estimates relate to very few
observations in the far end tails of the distributions.4 In order to visualize the estimates
based on more data, we have connected with lines the estimates where the number of
notional wage changes is at least one percent of the relevant population. Figure 5 shows
extensive dnwr at a wide range of wage growth rates for the ﬁrst three decades. The
downward slope of the fwcp-curves implies that relatively less wage changes are pushed
upwards for higher rates of wage growth. The leftward shift in the fwcp-curve over time
implies that a given fwcp apply to lower wage growth for each decade.
For the 1970s, we ﬁnd that dnwr aﬀected wage changes in the range between 1
and 7 percent wage growth. The fwcp at 1 percent is 0.74, implying that three out
of four notional wage changes below 1 percent are pushed up above 1 percent. Even at
the 7 percent ﬂoor the fwcp is 0.32. The ﬁgure shows that the estimates of the fwcp
below the 1 percent ﬂoor are also signiﬁcant, but, as noted above, based on very few
observations. In the 1980s, the estimates indicate that dnwr has been binding at least
between –2 and 6 percent, with a fwcp of 0.63 and 0.17 at the two extremes. Similarly,
we see that in the 1990s, dnwr binds between –5 and 1 percent, with a fwcp between
0.47 and 0.10. In the 2000s we only ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant dnwr at the 0.5 percent
ﬂoor, with a fwcp equal to 0.12.
The downward slope of the fwcp-curve is consistent with the theoretical bargaining
model of dnwr in Holden (2004). Intuitively, the deﬁcit of wage changes below a ﬂoor at
4 percent wage growth will be smaller than the deﬁcit below a ﬂoor at 2 percent growth,
because some of the notional wage changes below the 2 percent ﬂoor are pushed up,
4For example, in the 1970s we simulate 26.5 notional wage cuts. Compared to only 4 observed wage
cuts, the estimate of the fwcp at 0 percent is thus 85 percent. However, since these numbers are obtained
from a sample of 3331 observations, the estimate of the fwcp relates to the distribution below the 0.8












































Figure 5: Fraction of wage changes prevented at diﬀerent ﬂoor levels by periods. Signiﬁcant
estimates at the 5 percent level is marked by a “”. Estimates based on at least 1 percent of the
sample are connected with lines.
ﬁlling up some of the deﬁcit of wage changes below the 4 percent ﬂoor.
Note, however, that even if dnwr binds at lower wage growth rates over time, and the
fwcp are lower, there is also an opposing eﬀect when it comes to the economic importance
of dnwr. As inﬂation falls over time, implying that the wage change distribution moves
to the left, more wage change observations are potentially aﬀected by dnwr at any
given ﬂoor. Yet it turns out that the former eﬀect dominates, so that the number of
industry-year wage change observations that are aﬀected by dnwr is somewhat higher
in the 1970s and 1980s than in the 1990s and 2000s. In the 1970s and 1980s, around
1.5–2 percent of all industry-year wage changes are pushed up by the ﬂoors around 4–5
percent wage growth, while in the 1990s and 2000s, about 1–1.5 of the industry-year
wage changes are pushed up above the signiﬁcant ﬂoors around zero, see the ﬁgure in
Appendix B.
To show the cross sectional variation in dnwr, Figure 6 displays the results for four
regions; Anglo (Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, the uk and the us), Core (Austria, Bel-
gium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands), Nordic (Denmark, Finland,
Norway and Sweden) and South (Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain). These regions by
and large consist of countries with rather similar labour market institutions (see discus-
sion in Holden and Wulfsberg, 2008a). For all regions, there is substantial evidence of
dnwr at both positive and negative growth rates. The highest estimated fwcps for all
















































Figure 6: Fraction of wage changes prevented at diﬀerent ﬂoor levels. Signiﬁcant estimates at
the 5 percent level is marked by a “”. Estimates based on at least 1 percent of the sample are
connected with lines.
as these estimates are aggregates over time when inﬂation has varied a lot, we focus our
discussion on the results for each decade within each region, as presented in Figures 7–10.
The big picture is fairly similar across regions. In the 1970s, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant dnwr
in the form of ﬂoors for nominal wage growth around 3–4 percent in the Anglo region,
and for wider intervals in the other regions, with associated fwcp of 0.50 or more. In the
1980s, the ﬂoors apply to somewhat lower growth rates, but over a fairly wide interval
for all regions. In the Anglo and Core regions, the fwcps are around 0.30, as compared
to fwcps above 0.50 for some ﬂoors in the Nordic and South regions. In the 1990s, there
are signiﬁcant ﬂoors around zero and negative rates in all regions, with fwcps ranging
from 0.20 percent in the Anglo regions to 0.50 percent in the South. In the 2000s, there
are signiﬁcant ﬂoors in two regions only; at 2 percent in the South, and from minus 2.5
to 1 in the Nordic, with fwcps from 0.20 (South) to 0.30–0.50 (Nordic).
The weaker evidence of dnwr in the 2000s is consistent with Gordon’s conjecture
that the dnwr will weaken over time in periods with low inﬂation. However, one should
also note that there is evidence of dnwr in the Nordic countries and in the South, even
in the 2000s, in spite of a long period with low inﬂation in these countries. Furthermore,
caution is also warranted due to the feature discussed above that the downward bias in
the estimates is likely to be stronger in country-years with low inﬂation.
We do not have enough data to estimate fwcp-curves by periods for separate coun-
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Figure 7: Fraction of wage changes prevented at diﬀerent ﬂoor levels for the Anglo countries by
period. Signiﬁcant estimates at the 5 percent level is marked by a “”. Estimates based on at
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Figure 8: Fraction of wage changes prevented at diﬀerent ﬂoor levels for the Core region by
period. Signiﬁcant estimates at the 5 percent level is marked by a “”. Estimates based on at
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Figure 9: Fraction of wage changes prevented at diﬀerent ﬂoor levels for the Nordic region by
period. Signiﬁcant estimates at the 5 percent level is marked by a “”. Estimates based on at
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Figure 10: Fraction of wage changes prevented at diﬀerent ﬂoor levels for the South region by
periods. Signiﬁcant estimates at the 5 percent level is marked by a “”. Estimates based on at
least 1 percent of the sample are connected with lines.
15( = 0). We ﬁnd signiﬁcant dnwr at zero percent in Austria, Finland, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and Sweden. The fwcp is highest in Italy,
Portugal, Norway, and Greece, and lowest in Spain, Canada, Belgium, and France.
3.1 Robustness
In this section we consider the robustness of the results for the common shape assump-
tion, by undertaking three alternative ways of constructing the underlying distribution.
First, we use alternative cross-sample restrictions as to the structural form of the un-
derlying distribution. As the industry structure and wage setting system clearly vary
across countries, we construct country-speciﬁc underlying distributions, Gi, based on all
observations for each country, i.e. allowing for diﬀerences in the structural form across
countries. Then we proceed with the method as before. We also construct period-speciﬁc
underlying distributions, G, one for each decade, based on all observations within the
decade, to allow for eﬀects of structural changes over time (e.g. due to increased trade and
globalization). Again, we then proceed with the method as before. However, these alter-
native underlying distributions are constructed using a selection of country-year samples
which includes samples with low median wage growth, where dnwr may bind. Thus,
there is a risk that the shape of the underlying and notional distributions is compressed,
leading to a downward bias in the estimated dnwr.
Finally, we undertake the analysis with a symmetry assumption inspired by Lebow,
Stockton, and Wascher (1995) and Card and Hyslop (1997). Here, the notional distribu-
tions are constructed from the empirical ones by replacing observations below the median
with observations from the upper half of the distribution in the same country-year. Thus,
all country-year notional samples are symmetric, but the shape of the distributions dif-
fers across country-years. Observe that the symmetry approach involves no assumptions
of equal shape across country-year samples. In contrast, our main approach makes no
assumptions regarding symmetry. Thus, these two approaches are based on orthogonal
assumptions, involving a strong test of the robustness of our analysis. Note that also
the symmetry approach may involve a downward bias in the estimated dnwr, if ﬁrms
respond to dnwr by attenuating high wage increases, so as to reduce the risk that dnwr
is binding in the future (Elsby, 2006).
Figures D1–D6 in Appendix D compare our preferred estimates with estimates from
the country speciﬁc and symmetric alternatives. As can be seen from the diagrams, the
results of the alternative speciﬁcations turn out to be very similar to the results from the
main speciﬁcation. The estimated fwcp are somewhat lower, as should be expected due
to the possible downward bias in the alternative speciﬁcations. Yet the results from the
diﬀerent speciﬁcations provide a clear indication of the robustness of our ﬁndings.
In the present paper, we only consider the possibility of nominal ﬂoors for the wage
growth. In contrast, several studies have found empirical evidence for the existence of
considerable downward real wage rigidity in a number of oecd countries, mostly based on
16micro data, see Dickens et al. (2007), Barwell and Schweitzer (2004), Bauer et al. (2007),
and Christoﬁdes and Li (2005). In general, there is a problem of distinguishing between
real and nominal downward rigidity. However, given that we only include country-years
where the 35th percentile of the wage change distribution is above the ﬂoor, the nominal
ﬂoors we consider in the present paper are generally considerably below the rate of
inﬂation in the associated country-year. Thus, we view the ﬂoors that we identify as
chieﬂy the result of nominal lower bounds on the wage change process. In Holden and
Wulfsberg (2008b), we explore the possible existence of downward real wage rigidity in
the same industry data.
4 dnwr, inﬂation and institutions
In this section we explore to what extent economic and institutional variables are corre-
lated with the variation in fwcp across countries and time. Holden (2004) shows that
the prevalence of dnwr is likely to decrease with inﬂation (in a non-linear way), as
well as depend on institutional variables like the strictness of the employment protection
legislation (epl) and union density. Also other institutional variables like centralisation
and coordination of wage setting, or minimum wages, may potentially aﬀect the extent
of dnwr. Furthermore, high unemployment may weaken workers’ resistance to nominal
wage cuts. Thus, we regress the extent of dnwr as measured by the fwcp at each ﬂoor
in each country-year sample on inﬂation, inﬂation squared, unemployment, and institu-
tional variables to test whether these variables are related to dnwr. We also control for
the ﬂoor level, .
Regrettably, the data for institutional variables apply to each economy as a whole,
and not to the speciﬁc sectors in our data. This can be seen as measurement errors in the
left hand side variables, which will lead to a downward bias in the coeﬃcient estimates.
However, if we do ﬁnd an eﬀect, it seems likely that it will be the relationship that we
are interested in.
Technically, we undertake Poisson regressions where the number of observed wage
changes below ﬂoor  in each country-year sample, Y ()it, depends on the average num-
ber of simulated wage cuts for each country-year sample, ^ Y ()it, and the explanatory
variables mentioned above, xit. A Poisson regression seems appropriate, as Y ()it is the
number of times we observe an event (see Cameron and Trivedi, 1998). The conditional
density of the number of observed wage cuts in country-year it in the Poisson model is
f









Furthermore, we assume that the Poisson parameter, it, is given by
it = ^ Y ()itex0
it; if ^ Y ()it > 0: (6)
17Table 1: Pooled regressions.













Floor, 1970s 0:239 0:257 0:444 0:332 0:330 0:505
(0:023) (0:020) (0:032) (0:025) (0:021) (0:040)
Floor, 1980s 0:420 0:370 0:364 0:494 0:441 0:402
(0:019) (0:017) (0:018) (0:024) (0:021) (0:020)
Floor, 1990s 0:376 0:349 0:348 0:477 0:427 0:407
(0:024) (0:021) (0:021) (0:027) (0:023) (0:025)
Floor, 2000s 0:338 0:386 0:362 0:405 0:405 0:398
(0:029) (0:032) (0:024) (0:030) (0:032) (0:029)
Employment  0:399  0:263  0:226  0:400  0:203  0:251
protection (0:058) (0:164) (0:047) (0:069) (0:184) (0:057)
Union density  1:829  2:027  0:402  1:539  2:116  0:345
(0:276) (0:889) (0:210) (0:302) (0:993) (0:241)
Centralisation  0:191  0:266  0:234  0:196  0:254  0:283
(0:085) (0:116) (0:067) (0:093) (0:128) (0:079)
Coordination 0:164 0:251 0:193 0:132 0:311 0:219
(0:078) (0:109) (0:064) (0:088) (0:125) (0:073)
Inﬂation  0:513  0:351  0:267  0:585  0:439  0:295
(0:025) (0:036) (0:041) (0:034) (0:034) (0:039)
Inﬂation squared 0:014 0:007 0:005 0:016 0:010 0:006
(0:001) (0:002) (0:002) (0:001) (0:001) (0:002)
Unemployment  0:053 0:063 0:039  0:022 0:079 0:045
(0:011) (0:019) (0:011) (0:012) (0:022) (0:013)
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. The estimates are marked with
 if p < 0:1, with
 if p < 0:05, and with
 if p < 0:01.
where  is the parameter vector we want to estimate. Using the deﬁnition of the fwcp
and that it = E

Y ()it j ^ Y ()it;xit

we get




it+"it; if b Y ()it > 0 (7)
where "it is an error term.
In the ﬁrst three columns of Table 1 we present pooled estimates of (7) reporting
robust standard errors where the observations are clustered by country. We include
country dummies in the second column, and time dummies in the third column. The
restriction that E(Yit j b Yit;xit) = Var(Yit j b Yit;xit) = it, an implicit assumption by the
Poisson distribution, is accepted easily. We allow the slope of the fwcp-curves to vary
between periods as seen from Figure 6 by interacting the ﬂoor variable with a period
speciﬁc dummy. The positive coeﬃcients on the ﬂoor variables pick up the downward
slope of the fwcp-curves seen in most of the Figures 5–10 (note that the dependent
variable is 1   fwcp, i.e. the fraction of wage cuts realised).
18There is a strong positive correlation between inﬂation and the fwcp. The positive
correlation between inﬂation and the fwcp is consistent with the bargaining model of
dnwr in Holden (2004); under high inﬂation, nominal wage cuts are usually small, and
a high proportion are prevented by dnwr. Under low inﬂation, nominal wage cuts are
larger, and while dnwr works to reduce the size of the cuts, a larger fraction of them are
nevertheless realised. As expected, we also ﬁnd a negative eﬀect of unemployment on the
fwcp, at least when country or time dummies are included (without any dummies, the
unemployment variable is presumably capturing time or country eﬀects and the coeﬃcient
changes sign).
More strict epl, higher union density and more centralisation are positively correlated
with dnwr. Overall, the eﬀects are robust to the inclusion of country and time dummies.
The eﬀect of union density, however, is smaller when time dummies are included, and
the eﬀect of epl is not signiﬁcant when we include country dummies. The latter result
is not surprising, bearing in mind the limited time variation in the epl-variable. More
coordination in wage setting is negatively correlated with the fwcp, while we ﬁnd no
eﬀect of minimum wages. More strict epl, higher union density and more centralisation
are thus associated with an upward shift in the fwcp-curves, while more coordination
shifts the fwcp-curve downwards. The eﬀects of epl and union density are consistent
with, although somewhat stronger than, the results in our previous work (Holden and
Wulfsberg, 2008a), and also consistent with the theoretical arguments in Holden (2004).
That centralisation leads to more dnwr is consistent with previous ﬁndings that central-
isation of wage setting leads to wage compression (see Wallerstein, 1999). Our ﬁnding
indicates that centralisation also leads to compression of wage changes, in the sense that
low nominal wage changes are pushed up towards the median. In contrast, coordination
of wage setting seems to induce less downward wage rigidity. This is in line with the idea
that coordination of wage setting is about ensuring overall wage moderation, without
necessarily aﬀecting relative wages. Countries with both centralisation and coordination
of wage setting thus have about the same dnwr as countries with neither centralisation
nor coordination.
As a further test of the eﬀect of institutions on dnwr, we exploit that in the absence
of dnwr, the institutional variables should not be able to explain the country-year
variation in the empirical incidence rate of wage changes below each ﬂoor. Thus, we do
the same regressions as above, but without including the notional incidence rates in the
regressions. While this involves loss of information, it also has the advantage that it does
not rely on a speciﬁc distribution of the notional wage changes, making it complementary
to the former regressions. Thus, we estimate the eﬀects of the explanatory variables on
the empirical incidence rate of wage changes (below each ﬂoor), instead of the fraction of
wage changes realised. In other words, in this model we let the expected number of wage
cuts, it, depend on the number of observations (industries) in the country-year sample,
Sit, instead of b Yit:
it = Sitex0
it: (8)






where "it is an error term. With this speciﬁcation the poisson restriction E(Yit j Sit;xit) =
Var(Yit j Sit;xit) = it is rejected, hence we use the negative binomial regression model,
which allows for “overdispersion”.5
The results are displayed in the last three columns of Table 1. In accordance with the
theoretical predictions, epl, union density, centralisation and inﬂation, all have a negative
eﬀect on the incidence of nominal wage changes below each ﬂoor, while coordination
and unemployment have a positive eﬀect. The eﬀects of the institutional variables are
signiﬁcant apart from coordination in the model without dummies, epl in the model
with country dummies, and union density in the model with time dummies.
5 Concluding remarks
A number of recent papers have provided extensive evidence for the existence of con-
siderable downward nominal wage rigidity (dnwr) for job stayers, in many diﬀerent
countries see e.g. Knoppik and Beissinger (2005) and Dickens et al. (2007). However,
various mechanisms may transform dnwr at zero wage growth for individual workers to
ﬂoors at positive or negative growth rates for aggregate wages. For example, aggregate
wages fall when old, high-wage workers are replaced by younger workers with lower wages.
The eﬀect of the dnwr may then be a ﬂoor on nominal wage growth that is below zero,
e.g. at minus 2 percent. On the other hand, downward wage rigidity may also involve
growth in aggregate wages, to allow for changes in relative wages. Furthermore, when
wages are rigid downwards, it may provide workers with the possibility of threatening to
work less eﬃciently (work-to-rule), without the ﬁrm being able to retaliate, thus forcing
ﬁrms to grant a nominal wage increase.
We explore the existence of ﬂoors on nominal wage growth on industry data for 19
oecd countries, for the period 1973–2006. For the 1970s and 1980s, we ﬁnd evidence
of ﬂoors on nominal wage growth in oecd countries at all rates from minus 2 to plus
6 percent. Thus, there were signiﬁcantly less nominal wage changes below these growth
rates than one would have expected if wage setting had been entirely ﬂexible. While
our data with few exceptions does not allow for conclusions about the existence of wage
growth ﬂoors for individual countries, we do have indication of ﬂoors for the nominal
wage growth up till 4 percent growth for all the four regions we consider, namely Anglo
(native English-speaking countries), Southern European countries, Nordic countries, and
Core European countries.
5Overdispersion means that the variance in the data is greater than the mean, in contrast to the
Poisson assumption that the variance and the mean are equal. Using a goodness-of ﬁt test from a
Poisson regression of Yit=Sit, we reject no overdispersion with 
2(11;721) = 12566:57. Including a
Gamma-distributed error term, "it, allows the variance-to-mean ratios of Yit to be larger than unity.
20The ﬂoors on nominal wage growth in the 1970s and 1980s, even if considerably below
average inﬂation (in our sample an unweighted average of all countries of 10 percent in the
1970s and 8 percent in the 1980s), may have contributed to causing persistent inﬂation
in this period. A recent literature (see e.g. Nelson, 2005 and Meltzer, 2005) have argued
that the rise and persistence of high inﬂation in these years were mainly caused by several
errors in the conduct of the monetary policy. Our results add to these explanations by
showing that in the 1970s and 80s, an inﬂationary tendency was entrenched in the wage
setting system in many oecd countries. Given the ﬂoors on nominal wage growth, a
restrictive monetary policy to restrain wage and price growth would have led to further
compression of the wage change distribution, inducing both greater wage pressure and
compression of relative wages. The upshot would have been greater short run costs in
the form of higher unemployment from anti-inﬂation policies. Thus, our results can help
explaining why policymakers in most oecd countries failed to pursue a suﬃciently tight
monetary policy in the 1970s, and why the costs in terms of higher unemployment were
so severe when policy ﬁnally was tightened in the 1980s and 1990s.
The existence of these ﬂoors to growth in nominal wages must be seen in light of
the persistent high inﬂation rates in these decades. However, it is also clear that the
existence of the ﬂoors was not only a matter of persistent high inﬂationary expectations.
High inﬂation expectations would aﬀect the location of the wage change distribution, as
wage setters would set high nominal wage increases to reach their target real wages, but
it should not aﬀect the shape of the distribution. Thus, high inﬂationary expectations
would not by itself compress the lower part of the wage change distribution, which is the
eﬀect we ﬁnd in the 1970s and 1980s.
In the 1990s we also ﬁnd evidence of a ﬂoor on nominal wage growth at zero percent,
implying that 17 percent of the industry wage changes that should have been negative,
are pushed above zero by binding dnwr. In the 2000s, the evidence is weaker, yet
there is some indication of a ﬂoor on wage growth at the oecd level, and also some
evidence for the Southern European countries. For the Nordic countries there is, however,
more robust evidence of signiﬁcant dnwr also for the 2000s. The evidence of dnwr in
Southern European countries is especially interesting in light of the apparent high cost
levels in these countries, combined with the fact that they are members of the EMU,
and thus do not have the possibility of devaluing the currency. In Portugal and Italy,
high nominal wage growth relative to the productivity growth have led to a steady loss
of competitiveness, amplifying the diﬃcult economic situation these countries are in
(Blanchard, 2007). If nominal wages are rigid downwards in these countries, it may be
diﬃcult to escape from a position with weak international competitiveness.
The more limited and weaker evidence of dnwr in the 2000s may to some extent
reﬂect institutional changes like lower union density in many countries. It may also reﬂect
a stronger pressure on wages arising from increasing globalisation, or changes in wage
setting systems, as more ﬂexible pay systems, providing ﬁrms with more ﬂexibility to
reduce wages. However, our ﬁnding of less signiﬁcant dnwr in the 2000s may to some
21extent also be due to our method being less able to detect dnwr in a low inﬂation era.
We also ﬁnd that the extent of dnwr depends on institutional and economic variables.
We ﬁnd that wages are more rigid downwards when employment protection legislation is
strict, union density is high, and wages are set a centralised level. Coordination of wage
setting leads, however, to less dnwr.
Our ﬁnding of widespread dnwr in oecd countries over the recent decades raises the
question of how this feature of the wage setting has aﬀected other important variables
like output, employment and unemployment. Our analysis yields country-year speciﬁc
estimates of dnwr, albeit noisy, for 19 countries over more that 30 year, hence it provides
a good starting point for future work. A considerable extension of the data set in terms
of variables would be required, but it seems an interesting avenue for future research.
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A Data
We have obtained wage data for most countries and years from the ilo. The precise source
is Table 5A (Wages by economic activity) and Table 5B (Wages in manufacturing), from
yearly statistics under the domain Wages in the Laborsta database (laborsta.ilo.org).
Wage changes are calculated for observations within groups of the same source, worker
coverage, sex, type of data, industry classiﬁcation, country and year. We use observations
covering both men and women. If observations for both men and women are not available,
we use observations covering only men or only women. The wage variable is labeled either
“Earnings per hour” or “Wage rates per hour”. When they serve as alternatives, “Earnings
per hour” is used. The worker coverage is either “Salaried employees”, “Employees” or
“Wage earners”. The latter is preferred over the others, “Employees” is preferred over
“Salaried employees”. If there are several series with diﬀerent sources available we have
chosen the series with most observations.
The industry classiﬁcations used are isic rev. 2 and isic rev. 3. The data classiﬁed by
isic rev. 2 cover the groups: Mining and Quarrying (2), Manufacturing (3), Electricity,
Gas and Water (4) and Construction (5). The data classiﬁed by isic rev. 3 covers
Mining and Quarrying (C), Manufacturing (D), Electricity, Gas and Water Supply (E)
and Construction (F). We use data on various levels of aggregation from the section levels
(e.g., D Manufacturing) to group levels (e.g., DA 15 Manufacture of Food Products and
Beverages), however, using the most disaggregate level available in order to maximize
the number of observations. If, for example, wage data are available for D and DA 15,
we use the latter only to avoid counting the same observations twice. The data chosen
24for Germany is the series labeled “Germany, Fed. Rep. of before 3.10.1990”, thus the
series relates to the territory of the Fed. Rep. of Germany before 3.10.1990.
Some country-year samples are missing from the ilo database, for which we use data
from Eurostat. These country-years are Austria (1974–1999), Belgium (1995), Germany
(1973) Spain (1996), France (1976, 1985, 1988, 1994–1996), Ireland (1985), Italy (1973–
1985), Portugal (1994, 1995, 1998) and United Kingdom (1980, 1983). The precise
source is Table hmwhour in the Harmonized Earnings Domain under the Population
and Social Conditions theme in the newcronos database. hmwhour is labeled “Gross
hourly earnings of manual workers in industry”. Gross earnings cover remuneration in
cash paid directly and regularly by the employer at the time of each wage payment,
before tax deductions and social security contributions payable by wage earners and
retained by the employer. Payments for leave, public holidays, and other paid individual
absences, are included in principle, in so far as the corresponding days or hours are also
taken into account to calculate earnings per unit of time. The weekly hours of work are
those in a normal week’s work (i.e., not including public holidays) during the reference
period (October or last quarter). These hours are calculated on the basis of the number
of hours paid, including overtime hours paid. Furthermore, we use data in national
currency, and males and females are both included in the data. The data for Germany
does not include gdr before 1990 or new Länder. The data are recorded by classiﬁcation
of economic activities (nace Rev. 1). The sections represented are Mining and quarrying
(C), Manufacturing (D), Electricity, gas and water supply (E), and Construction (F). The
principles guiding which observation to choose when several are available are the same as
described for the ilo data. Data for wages in manufacturing for Italy 2002–2006 are from
Istat (Istituto nazionale di statistica). Data for Norway are from Statistics Norway. The
distribution of the number of observations by years and countries are reported in Table
A1. We have removed 3 extreme observations from the sample. The average number
of observations per country-year sample is 22.6, with a standard error of 4.9. Table A2
shows the 35th percentile wage growth in each country-year sample.
Data for inﬂation and unemployment are from the oecd Economic Outlook database.
The primary sources for the employment protection legislation (epl) index, which is
displayed in Table A3, are oecd (2004) for the 1980–1999 period and Lazear (1990) for
the years before 1980. We follow the same procedure as Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) to
construct time-varying series, which is to use the oecd summary measure in the ‘Late
1980s’ for 1980–89 and the ‘Late 1990s’ for 1995–99. For 1990–94, we interpolate the
series. For 1973–79, the percentage change in Lazear’s index is used to back-cast the
oecd measure. However, we are not able to reconstruct the Blanchard and Wolfers data
exactly.
Data for union density before 1990 is from oecd (2004). Data for Greece for 1978 and
1979 are interpolated, while data before 1977 is extrapolated at the 1977 level. From 1990
onwards we have used data from Visser (2006). Data for centralisation and coordination



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































29Table A5: Indices of centralisation.
Year AT BE CA DE DK ES FI FR IE IT NL NO NZ PT SW UK US
1971 3.0 4.0 1.0 3.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.5 3.0 5.0 5.0 2.0 1.0
1972 3.0 4.0 1.0 3.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.5 3.0 5.0 5.0 2.0 1.0
1973 3.0 4.0 1.0 3.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.5 3.0 5.0 5.0 2.0 1.0
1974 3.0 4.0 1.0 3.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.5 3.0 5.0 5.0 2.0 1.0
1975 3.0 3.5 1.0 3.0 5.0 4.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.5 3.0 4.0 5.0 2.0 1.0
1976 3.0 3.5 1.0 3.0 5.0 4.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.5 3.0 4.0 5.0 2.0 1.0
1977 3.0 3.5 1.0 3.0 5.0 4.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.5 3.0 4.0 5.0 2.0 1.0
1978 3.0 3.5 1.0 3.0 5.0 4.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.5 3.0 4.0 5.0 2.0 1.0
1979 3.0 3.5 1.0 3.0 5.0 4.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.5 3.0 4.0 5.0 2.0 1.0
1980 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 2.0 1.0 3.5 3.0 3.5 3.0 3.0 4.5 1.0 1.0
1981 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 2.0 1.0 3.5 3.0 3.5 3.0 3.0 4.5 1.0 1.0
1982 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 2.0 1.0 3.5 3.0 3.5 3.0 3.0 4.5 1.0 1.0
1983 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 2.0 1.0 3.5 3.0 3.5 3.0 3.0 4.5 1.0 1.0
1984 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 2.0 1.0 3.5 3.0 3.5 3.0 3.0 4.5 1.0 1.0
1985 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 3.5 5.0 2.0 2.5 2.0 3.0 4.5 3.0 3.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
1986 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 3.5 5.0 2.0 2.5 2.0 3.0 4.5 3.0 3.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
1987 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 3.5 5.0 2.0 2.5 2.0 3.0 4.5 3.0 3.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
1988 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 3.5 5.0 2.0 2.5 2.0 3.0 4.5 3.0 3.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
1989 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 3.5 5.0 2.0 2.5 2.0 3.0 4.5 3.0 3.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
1990 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
1991 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
1992 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
1993 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
1994 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
1995 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 2.0 3.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
1996 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 2.0 3.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
1997 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 2.0 3.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
1998 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 2.0 3.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
1999 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 2.0 3.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
2000 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
2001 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
2002 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
2003 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
2004 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
2005 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
2006 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
30Table A6: Indices of coordination.
Year AT BE CA DE DK ES FI FR IE IT NL NO NZ PT SW UK US
1971 5.0 4.0 1.0 4.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.5 4.0 5.0 4.0 3.0 1.0
1972 5.0 4.0 1.0 4.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.5 4.0 5.0 4.0 3.0 1.0
1973 5.0 4.0 1.0 4.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.5 4.0 5.0 4.0 3.0 1.0
1974 5.0 4.0 1.0 4.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.5 4.0 5.0 4.0 3.0 1.0
1975 5.0 3.5 3.0 4.0 5.0 4.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 4.0 4.5 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 1.0
1976 5.0 3.5 3.0 4.0 5.0 4.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 4.0 4.5 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 1.0
1977 5.0 3.5 3.0 4.0 5.0 4.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 4.0 4.5 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 1.0
1978 5.0 3.5 3.0 4.0 5.0 4.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 4.0 4.5 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 1.0
1979 5.0 3.5 3.0 4.0 5.0 4.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 4.0 4.5 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 1.0
1980 4.5 4.0 1.0 4.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 2.0 1.0 3.5 4.5 3.5 4.0 3.0 3.5 1.0 1.0
1981 4.5 4.0 1.0 4.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 2.0 1.0 3.5 4.5 3.5 4.0 3.0 3.5 1.0 1.0
1982 4.5 4.0 1.0 4.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 2.0 1.0 3.5 4.5 3.5 4.0 3.0 3.5 1.0 1.0
1983 4.5 4.0 1.0 4.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 2.0 1.0 3.5 4.5 3.5 4.0 3.0 3.5 1.0 1.0
1984 4.5 4.0 1.0 4.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 2.0 1.0 3.5 4.5 3.5 4.0 3.0 3.5 1.0 1.0
1985 4.0 4.0 1.0 4.0 4.0 3.5 5.0 2.0 2.5 2.0 4.0 4.5 4.0 3.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
1986 4.0 4.0 1.0 4.0 4.0 3.5 5.0 2.0 2.5 2.0 4.0 4.5 4.0 3.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
1987 4.0 4.0 1.0 4.0 4.0 3.5 5.0 2.0 2.5 2.0 4.0 4.5 4.0 3.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
1988 4.0 4.0 1.0 4.0 4.0 3.5 5.0 2.0 2.5 2.0 4.0 4.5 4.0 3.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
1989 4.0 4.0 1.0 4.0 4.0 3.5 5.0 2.0 2.5 2.0 4.0 4.5 4.0 3.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
1990 4.0 4.0 1.0 4.0 3.0 3.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 3.0 4.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
1991 4.0 4.0 1.0 4.0 3.0 3.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 3.0 4.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
1992 4.0 4.0 1.0 4.0 3.0 3.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 3.0 4.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
1993 4.0 4.0 1.0 4.0 3.0 3.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 3.0 4.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
1994 4.0 4.0 1.0 4.0 3.0 3.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 3.0 4.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
1995 4.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 4.0 3.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
1996 4.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 4.0 3.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
1997 4.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 4.0 3.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
1998 4.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 4.0 3.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
1999 4.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 4.0 3.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
2000 4.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 4.0 5.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 4.0 1.0 1.0
2001 4.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 4.0 5.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 4.0 1.0 1.0
2002 4.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 4.0 5.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 4.0 1.0 1.0
2003 4.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 4.0 5.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 4.0 1.0 1.0
2004 4.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 4.0 5.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 4.0 1.0 1.0
2005 4.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 4.0 5.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 4.0 1.0 1.0
2006 4.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 4.0 5.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 4.0 1.0 1.0
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Figure B1: The fraction of industry-years aﬀected (q   ~ q) by periods.
C Country estimates
Table C1: Results from 5000 simulations on countries.
Country Si Ti qi ~ qi fwcpi
Italy 420 18 0.000 0.024 1:000
Portugal 752 32 0.012 0.039 0:692
Norway 801 35 0.004 0.012 0:687
Greece 542 28 0.004 0.010 0:617
Austria 581 33 0.007 0.017 0:584
Sweden 804 33 0.009 0.021 0:576
Finland 467 27 0.011 0.021 0:496
Luxembourg 531 35 0.028 0.054 0:476
Ireland 677 33 0.038 0.060 0:360
Netherlands 902 34 0.034 0.053 0:352
uk 904 36 0.041 0.050 0:174
Germany 866 33 0.009 0.011 0:173
Denmark 657 34 0.043 0.049 0:135
New Zealand 880 34 0.057 0.065 0:129
us 703 34 0.016 0.018 0:126
Spain 585 29 0.044 0.050 0:105
Canada 913 35 0.090 0.098 0:085
Belgium 801 33 0.042 0.045 0:057
France 694 33 0.023 0.023 0:018
Notes: Ti is the number of years. The estimates are marked
with
 if p < 0:1, with
 if p < 0:05, and with



















































Figure D1: Estimates of the fraction of wage changes prevented at diﬀerent ﬂoor levels by pe-
riods. Dark blue lines and x-markers represent estimates based on the default method presented
in the paper; red lines and circle markers represent estimates based on country-speciﬁc notional
distributions; lime green lines and triangle markers represent estimates based on symmetric no-
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Figure D6: Fraction of wage changes prevented at diﬀerent ﬂoor levels by periods for the South
region.
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